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III.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to assignment from the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah made under authority of Utah
Code Annotated 78-2A-3(2)(k), 1953 As Amended.

The Supreme Court

had original jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-22(3)(i), 1953 As Amended.

The transfer of the case was enabled on

September 16, 1992 pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2(4), 1953
As Amended.

IV.
1.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Denial of Motion to Suppress. Did the Trial Court commit

error by denying the Defendant's PreTrial Motion to Suppress
Evidence obtained in a warrantless search and by allowing admission
of said evidence at Trial.
2.

Sufficiency of the Evidence. Was the conviction of the

Defendant supported by reliable evidence to reasonably support each
element of

the offense

reasonable doubt.

to the standard

of

guilty beyond a

3.

Denial of Motion to Arrest Judgment, Did the Trial Court

commit error by refusing to grant the Defendant's post trial Motion
to Arrest Judgment.

V.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses,
papers,
and
effects,
against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
The Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 14:
Sec. 14 [Unreasonable searches forbidden - Issuance of
warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 23.
Arrest of Judgment.
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the
court upon its own initiative may, or upon motion of a
defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or
admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the
defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good cause
for the arrest of judgment. Upon arresting judgment the
court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the offense
charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a
commitment until the defendant is charged anew or
retried, or may enter any other order as may be just and
proper under the circumstances.
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VI.
1.

STATEMENT OF CASE

Nature of Case. The Defendant appeals his conviction by

a jury for Theft of Money, a third degree felony, in the First
Judicial District Court, in and for Box Elder County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Clint S. Judkins presiding.
2.

Statement of Facts,

The Defendant and a Co-Defendant,

Toya J. Reynolds, hereinafter referred to as Reynolds, were charged
in an Information [R. 2-3] with Theft of Money from Drewes Floral
on February 13, 1992 in violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-6-404,
1953 As Amended1,
Drewes Floral is a retail store located on Main Street in
Brigham City, Utah, On February 13, 1992 an employee of the store,
Shari Oiler, obtained cash from the local branch of the First
Security Bank. When she returned to the store at about 11:00 a.m.
with the cash, she observed the Defendant and the Co-Defendant,
Reynolds, in the store.
desk drawer.

Ms. Oiler locked the cash in an office

At about 2:00 that afternoon Ms. Oiler discovered

that the desk drawer had been forced open and the money was gone
[Trial Transcript, page 45, line 7 - page 46, line 1].
On the same afternoon at about 2:41 p.m. the Defendant and the
Co-Defendant, Reynolds, were stopped by Salt Lake County Deputies
outside of a thrift store located at approximately 3656 South State
Street in Salt Lake City in connection with a reported attempted
theft in the store.

The Co-Defendant, Reynolds, was arrested for

1

An Amended Information was filed prior to Trial charging
the same crime as the original offense [R. 134 - 135].
3

a misdemeanor attempted purse snatching in the store and the
Defendant was released

as not being

involved.

The deputies

searched the automobile in which the Defendant and Co-Defendant,
Reynolds,.arrived at the thrift store.

Keys to the car and its1

glove compartment were obtained from the Co-Defendant, Reynolds,
and cash which was later entered as exhibits 3 & 4 at the Trial of
this matter, was obtained from the locked glove compartment.
After arraignment in the District Court, the Defendant filed
a Motion to Suppress [R. 67-68] with supporting Memorandum [R. 6975] requesting the Court to suppress evidence of the search of the
vehicle and the evidence seized therefrom.2

The Co-Defendant,

Reynolds, filed a similar Motion to Suppress and the Court held a
combined Evidentiary Hearing on both Motions to Suppress on the
30th day of April, 1992 [see April 30, 1992 Hearing Transcript,
page 5 - 62]. The parties entered into an agreed set of facts at
the Motion Hearing upon which Judge Judkins made his decision at
the conclusion of the Hearing.

The Court ruled that the search of

the vehicle "was an inventory search pursuant to an impoundment"
[4/30 Transcript, page 59, lines 14 - 15] and that the impoundment
of the vehicle was unreasonable and therefor granted the CoDefendant, Reynolds, Motion to Suppress [4/30 Transcript, page 58,
line 3 - page 62, line 2].

In ruling on the Defendant's Motion to

Suppress, the Court found "that defendant Scott was a passenger in
the vehicle, that he arrived at the location of where the vehicle
2

The evidence was admitted at Trial as exhibits 2, 3, & 4
and testimony from Gene C. Van Rosendahl, Scott Bannon,
Chris Owenby, and Jim Cleverly.
4

was impounded as a passenger, and that he left certain items of
personal property in the vehicle", but went on to rule that the
Defendant did not have standing and therefor denied the Defendant's
Motion to Suppress [4/30 T., page 58, line 6 - page 59, line 3].
The State thereafter dismissed the case against Co-Defendant,
Reynolds.
The charge against the Defendant was tried to a jury beginning
on June 29, 1992.

The Defendant thereafter filed a Motion to

Arrest Judgment [R. 171] and Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Arrest Judgment [R. 172-174].

Hearing on said Motion was held on

July 23, 1992 at the conclusion of which the Trial Court denied the
Motion [see July 23, 1992 Hearing Transcript, page 14, line 20 page 15, line 14]. The Court thereafter sentenced the Defendant to
the Utah State Prison.

VII.
1.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Defendant had standing to challenge the vehicle

search and/or seizure of the evidence from the glove compartment of
the vehicle, and his Motion to Suppress should therefor have been
granted; and exhibits 2, 3, & 4, and testimony in relation to the
search and seizure should have been excluded at Trial.
a).

The Defendant

had

a legitimate

expectation of

privacy in the vehicle and/or the glove compartment and the Trial
Court failed to address and take the expectation into account.
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b).

The Defendant had a possessory interest in the

property seized from the glove compartment and the Court failed to
take that interest into account.
c).

In interpreting Article I, Section 14 of the Utah

State Constitution the Court should adopt the "legitimately on the
premises11 standard created in the case of Jones vs. United States,
362 US 257, 4 L Ed.2d 697, and/or the "target" theory whereby any
criminal defendant

at whom a search was directed would have

standing to contest the legality of that search and object to the
admission at Trial of evidence obtained as result of the search.
2.

The evidence presented at Trial was insufficient to

establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasotable doubt.
The Defendant's presumption of innocence was not overcome by proof
of all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and the
Defendant should have therefor been acquitted.
a).

There was a complete lack of evidence presented at

Trial to establish whether the theft was committed; 1) by the
Defendant solely, 2) by the Defendant acting in concert with the
Co-Defendant, Reynolds, or 3) by the Co-Defendant acting without
participation of the Defendant.

The evidence at Trial equally

supports either of the three (3) possibilities.
3,
Arrest

The Trial Court in denying the Defendant's Motion in
of

Judgment

failed

to

apply

the

proper

standard

in

evaluating the evidence upon which the verdict was based and failed
to make sufficient findings in support of its decision.

6

a).

In ruling upon the Motion for Arrest of Judgment,

the Trial Court should have determined that the inferences from the
evidence equally pointed to a not guilty finding as well as a
guilty finding*

The inferences from the evidence equally support

the finding that:

1) the Defendant committed the theft alone or,

2) the Defendant committed the theft acting in concert with the CoDefendant, Reynolds, or 3) the Co-Defendant, Reynolds, committed
the theft without the participation of the Defendant. The evidence
upon

which

the

jury

inferred

the

Defendant's

guilt

was

so

inherently improbable that no reasonable mind could have based a
finding beyond a reasonable doubt thereon.
b).

That the Trial Court in announcing its decision to

deny the Defendant's Motion for Arrest of Judgment failed to make
adequate finding explaining its decision.

VIII.
1.

ARGUMENT

Standing to Challenge Illegal Search.

The Trial Court

determined that the search of the vehicle was an inventory search
incident to impoundment of the vehicle, but that the impoundment of
the vehicle was not authorized; and therefor, the search and
seizure

of

evidence

was

in

violation

of

Fourth

Amendment

guarantees; and therefor, granted the Co-Defendant, Reynolds,
Motion to Dismiss [4/30 T. page 59, line 4 - page 62, line 2].

But

for the Trial Court's determination of the Defendant's lack of
standing, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress would also have been
granted.
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The Court initially ruled on the Defendant's Motion to
Suppress and found that the Defendant

lacked standing at the

conclusion of the Motion Hearing on April 30, 1992.

The Court

ruling and reasons therefor, are contained in the transcript of
said Hearing beginning at page 58, line 6 and ending at page 59,
line 3.
The Defendant thereafter filed a Supplemental Memorandum
addressing the specific issue of standing [R. 113-118] and the
Court after receiving the Supplemental Memorandum, re-addressed the
Motion to Suppress immediately before Trial

[Trial T. page 4,

lines 4-16] and ruled; "And for the reasons previously stated this
Court has not been persuaded any differently from the original
position the Court took by (sic) the Memorandums and therefore will
deny those Motions to quash and to suppress".
a).

Expectation of Privacy. As stated by this Court in

State vs. Rowe 806 P.2d

730

(Utah App. 1991) the capacity,

"standing" to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends
on whether the persoi* claiming the protection has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the invaded place.

Also see:

Katz vs.

United States 389 US 347, 19 L Ed.2d 576; Rakas vs. Illinois 439 US
128, 58 L Ed.2d 387.
The Trial Court did not address the Defendant's
legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle and/or the glove
compartment of the vehicle.

The fact that the Defendant had left

certain items in the vehicle and the fact that the vehicle had been
left locked is some evidence of an expectation of privacy by the
8

Defendant even though he was simply a passenger.

It is clear that

many passengers in vehicles who leave items in a vehicle such as
stereos, boom boxes, purses, or money request the driver of the
vehicle to lock the vehicle and have a strong expectation of
privacy therein.
In regard to the money seized from the locked glove
compartment, the only reason that the State proposed to present it
at Trial was to show that the Defendant had some possessory
interest in the stolen money to imply that he had committed the
theft. The possibility of a possessory interest in the Defendant,
the fact that the glove compartment had been left locked, are
strong indications of an expectation of privacy in the Defendant.
The Trial Court clearly erred by not addressing the Defendants
expectation of privacy.
b).

Possessory Interest in Property Seized.

It is a

well settled proposition that a possessory interest in the property
seized confers standing to challenge the seizure by a Motion to
Suppress, Katz vs. United States supra, Rakas vs. Illinois supra,
and State of Utah vs. Rowe supra, and Jones vs. United States 362
US 257, 4 L Ed.2d 697.
It likewise has been held in the case of United
States vs. Jeffers 342 US 48, 96 L Ed. 59, that the fact that goods
in which a Defendant asserts a proprietary interest or contraband
does not defeat his standing to question the constitutionality of
seizure thereof.

9

As pointed out above, the only relevancy of the
seized money in this case, is the implication that the Defendant
had a possessory interest or claim to the money, thereby implying
that he stole the same from Drewes Floral. The State should not be
allowed to have it both ways, either the Defendant had a possessory
interest in the property seized from the locked glove compartment
giving him standing to contest the seizure or he had no interest in
the money and the evidence should not have been admitted at Trial
against him.
c).

Interpretation of Article I. Section 14 Utah State

Constitution. Although the language of Article I, § 14 of the Utah
State Constitution is the same as the language of the Fourth
Amendment, this Court is not bound by the interpretation given the
Fourth Amendment when interpreting Article I, § 14.
This Court should give an expansive interpretation
of Article I, § 14 such as that given by the eight members of the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Jones vs. United States
supra, said interpretation being referred to as the "target" theory
by the five members of the Supreme Court in Rakas vs. Illinois
supra.

This Court should follow the Jones language which states:

In order to qualify as a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure1 one must have been a victim of a
search or seizure, one against
whom the search
was
directed,
This

Court

should

reject

the

restrictive

interpretation given by the five member majority in the Rakas vs.
Illinois supra case and instead follow the four dissenters in the
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Rakas case which urges the continued use of the "legitimately on
the premises" standard.
2.

Insufficiency of Evidence. The standard of review which

this Court

should apply in reviewing

the sufficiency of the

evidence upon which the Defendant was convicted, was set out by
this Court in State vs. Singer 815 P.2d 1303 (Utah App, 1991) as
follows:
When reviewing whether evidence is sufficient
to support a jury conviction,
we review the evidence and all
inferences which may be reasonably
drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the verdict of the
jury. We reverse a jury conviction
for insufficient evidence only when
the
evidence,
so
viewed,
is
sufficiently
inconclusive
or
inherently
improbable
that
reasonable
minds
must
have
entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of
which he was convicted. Also see
State vs. Petrel, 659 P.2d 443,
(Utah 1983).
In this case inferences which can be drawn from the
evidence presented at Trial points at least as equally strong at
not guilty as at guilty.
Defendant

committed

the

The evidence does not establish that the
theft

alone,

or

that

the Defendant

committed the theft along with the Co-Defendant, Reynolds.

The

only clear inference is that the Co-Defendant, Reynolds, committed
the theft.

The evidence presented at Trial from testimony of

employees of Drewes Floral, Shari Oiler [Trial T. page 28-55],
Pauline Barnes [Trial T. page 156-178], and Teresa Buchanan [Trial
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T. page

178-184] placed

the Defendant

and

the Co-Defendant,

Reynolds, at the store as follows:
(1) When Shari Oiler returned to the store from the bank at
around 11:00 a.m. with the money in the bag.

She saw both the

Defendant and the Co-Defendant, Reynolds, in the store.
Defendant

was

coming

employment application.

out

of

the

office

and

asked

about

The
an

Both the Defendant and the Co-Defendant,

Reynolds, were in a position to observe the money Ms. Oiler was
carrying.

The Defendant and the Co-Defendant, Reynolds, were both

at a counter in the store area when Ms. Oiler proceeded to go into
the office to put the money in the desk drawer.

Ms. Oiler

discovered the money missing from the desk drawer about 2:00 p.m.

(2) When Ms. Oiler returned with the money Pauline Barnes, in
referring to the Defendant and Co-Defendant, Reynolds, stated, "I
just saw them in the shop.
doing.

I really didn't notice what they were

I just knew that they were still looking around our shop

looking around." [Trial T. page 164, lines 16-18]. Ms. Barnes says
they were in the store about twenty (20) minutes.
(3) Teresa Buchanan observed the Co-Defendant, Reynolds, in
the store and answered his inquiries regarding flowers. She never
saw the Defendant in the store.
The only evidence presented at Trial which could connect the
Defendant to the stolen money came from the testimony of the Salt
Lake County Deputies; Gene C. Van Rosendahl [Trial T. page 55-73],
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Scott Bannon [Trial T. page 74-100], and Chris Owenby [Trial T.
page 100-118] as follows:
(1) The Defendant and the Co-Defendant, Reynolds, traveled to
the thrift

store

in Mr. Reynold's

fatherfs

or

grandfather's

automobile.
(2) The automobile was parked outside of the thrift store at
about 2:41 p.m., when the deputies arrived, with its' doors locked.
(3) The keys to the automobile were recovered from the CoDefendant, Reynolds, pocket

and the car was unlocked by the

deputies.
(4) The money, appearing to be the stolen money, was in the
automobile locked in the glove compartment.
glove

compartment

was

also

recovered

The key to unlock the

from

the

Co-Defendant,

Reynold's, pocket.
(5) That

the

Co-Defendant,

Reynolds,

in

response

to

questioning by Deputy Owenby, claimed ownership of the money [Trial
T. page 113, line 4 - page 114, line 10 and page 116, line 20 page 117, line 3].

There is a fairly strong inference that the Co-

Defendant, Reynolds, participated in the theft because of his claim
of ownership of the money. No such inference can be drawn from any
of the evidence in relation to the Defendant in this matter.

The

Defendant's presumption of innocence clearly has not been overcome
by the evidence in this case.
3.

Ruling on Motion in Arrest of Judgment.

The Defendant

made a Motion for Arrest of Judgment under Rule 23, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.

The Motion was argued at the Hearing on
13

July 23, 1992 [7/23 Hearing T. page 2-15].

The Utah Courts have

clearly set out the standard by which such Motions shall be judged,
State vs. Mevers 606 P.2d 250 (Utah 1980), State vs. Workman 806
P.2d 1198.(Utah App. 1991).
This Court clearly set out the standard in the Workman
case in the following quote from the Meyers case:
[A] court has the right, and indeed should
exercise the duty, to arrest a judgment after
a jury verdict in an appropriate case. . .
In short, the
legal mechanism of
arresting a judgment is a firmly entrenched
exception to the rule of law in a proper
case
that jurors are the exclusive judges of the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of
the evidence.
Id. (emphasis in original).
For an appellate court, or a trial court,
as is the case, here, to substitute its
judgment for that of the jury, the verdict
must be based on evidence lfso inherently
improbable that no reasonable mind could
believe it." Id. (citations omitted). Under
such circumstance, an arrest of judgment is
appropriate.
At the Conclusion of the July 23 Hearing the on Motion
the Trial Court denied the Motion ruling at page 14, line 24 - page
15, line 14, as follows:
In this particular case I feel the standard is
whether or not there was sufficient evidence
that was submitted or introduced that may lead
the jury to determine that all of the elements
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Now,
if there wasn't sufficient evidence that was
submitted, then this court has to determine
that and then the court would arrest judgment.
In this particular case, the court finds
that there was evidence submitted to support
each of the elements. Ifm not saying whether
that is beyond a reasonable doubt or not.
That's up to the jury. My job in determining
this is as to whether or not there was

14

evidence submitted which would support their
verdict. I find that there was. Therefore,
your motion to arrest judgment is denied . . .
The Trial court in making its ruling did not address the
quality

of

the

evidence

and/or

appropriate to be drawn therefrom.

the

inferences

which

were

Particularly the evidence from

which the jury inferred that the Defendant, participated in the
theft with the Co-Defendant, Reynolds, or why an equally strong
inference could not be drawn that the Defendant did not participate
in the theft.
The Trial Court's ruling does not provide any explanation
in ruling to insure that the Trial Judge followed that standard
required in ruling on a motion in arrest of judgment.

IX.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion this Court should find that the Defendant had
standing to challenge the illegal search and/or seizure because he
had a legitimate expectation of privacy and/or because he had a
possessory interest in property contained in the vehicle, including
the property seized.
should

The evidence of the search and/or seizure

therefor be suppressed as in the Co-Defendant, Reynolds

case.
Secondly, this Court should determine that the evidence upon
which the Defendant was convicted was insufficient to sustain the
conviction.

That the inferences to be drawn from the evidence

equally supported a finding of not guilty as a finding of guilty
and the Defendant therefor should be acquitted.

15

Thirdly, it should

be determined that the Trial Court did not

apply the proper standard in reviewing the Defendant's Motion in
Arrest of Judgment and/or did not issue an appropriate decision
explaining the Trial Court's finding and this Court should therefor
remand

for further determination of the Motion in Arrest of

Judgment.
WHEREFORE the Defendant requests this Court to reverse his
conviction and dismiss the case against him, or in the alternative
to remand for a new Trial, and/or for further proceedings on the
Motion in Arrest of Judgment*
Respectfully submitted this

day of May, 1993.
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Jack H. Molgard
Attorney for the Appellant
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P. 0. Box 461
Brigham City, UT 84302
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